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A REQUIEM FOR SAM’S BANK 
RONALD J. MANN*
INTRODUCTION 
Wal-Mart’s application to form a bank ignited controversy among 
disparate groups, ranging from union backers to realtor’s groups to 
charitable organizations.1 The dominant voice, though, was that of 
independent bankers complaining that the big-box retailer would drive 
them out of business. Wal-Mart denied any interest in competing with local 
banks by opening branches,2 claiming that it was interested only in 
payments processing. Distrusting Wal-Mart, the independent bankers urged 
the FDIC to deny Wal-Mart’s request and lobbied state and federal 
lawmakers to block Wal-Mart’s plans through legislation. Ultimately, Wal-
Mart withdrew its application, concluding that it stood little chance of 
overcoming the opposition. 
The controversy dovetails with a banking regulatory concern about the 
existing system for supervising commercial firms that own non-traditional 
banks. Wal-Mart sought to form an industrial loan company (“ILC”) under 
Utah law,3 which it could do only if the FDIC approved its application for 
deposit insurance.4 Under what many regard as a loophole in the existing 
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful for input from presentations at the law schools 
at the University of Michigan and Columbia, at the Payment Cards Center at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, and at the Conference on Rethinking Payment Law at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. 
 1. The FDIC received thousands of comments in response to Wal-Mart’s application for deposit 
insurance and held the first formal public hearings ever on such an application. Wal-Mart’s application 
as well as the public comments, written statements and hearing transcripts are available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/walmart/index.html. 
 2. A number of states nevertheless reacted by introducing bills to ban out-of-state industrial 
banks from opening bank branches in their states, several of which appear to violate the Riegle Neal 
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g), 1828(d)(4). See Letter from Julie Williams, Chief Counsel, OCC, et al., to 
John “Buz” Gorman, General Counsel, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (July 28, 2006). 
 3. Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-3. Industrial loan companies were created a century ago to make loans 
to workers but they have evolved in recent years as they gained limited powers to accept deposits and 
make loans. 
 4. Without regard to any intent to accept deposits, Wal-Mart would need deposit insurance to 
satisfy both its stated business objectives and the requirements of Utah law. Wal-Mart did plan to offer 
certificates of deposit to charitable organizations and individual investors generated through deposit 
brokers, but not demand deposits. See Application, supra note 1. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098276
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statutory framework,5 Wal-Mart’s regulator would have been the FDIC, 
and Wal-Mart’s primary responsibility to this entity would have been to 
refrain from plundering its assets.6 By contrast, entities that own traditional 
banks (“bank holding companies” or “financial holding companies”) are 
subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve and to various “prompt 
corrective action” rules that obligate the parent in times of distress to 
provide aid to the banking subsidiary. In some cases the Federal Reserve 
can force divestiture.7
Despite Wal-Mart’s ability to provide more than adequate capital for 
an ILC, the FDIC responded first by freezing all deposit insurance 
applications submitted from proposed ILCs first for six months (through 
Jan. 2007), and then by freezing applications filed by non-financial entities 
for another year (through Jan. 2008).8 The FDIC explained that it needed 
more time to examine the impact of ILCs on the banking system.9 Federal 
regulators are concerned about the ILC structure because the number and 
size of the entities using the ILC loophole has mushroomed in the last few 
years.10 Absent some action, the owners of an increasingly significant share 
of institutions will become largely unsupervised. 
At the same time, financial holding companies and thrift holding 
companies (entities like CitiGroup and Merrill Lynch that own both deposit 
institutions and other financial services companies) believe that Wal-Mart’s 
 5. The loophole appears in Section 101 of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 
(CEBA), which defined “bank” for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act to exclude qualifying 
ILCs, credit card banks (as defined in CEBA), and certain then-existing “nonbank” banks. Because this 
entity would not be a “bank” for purposes of that statute, Wal-Mart could own it without being a bank 
holding company. Among other things, the exemption requires the ILC to obtain deposit insurance from 
the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H). The statute also requires that the entity satisfy one of the three 
following conditions: that it have not changed control since 1987, that it have less than $100 million in 
assets, or that it not accept demand deposits. Utah law uses the term “industrial bank” to refer in Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-8-3 to the Utah entity that qualifies for the federal ILC exception in Section 
1841(c)(2)(H). To make matters confusing, Utah also recognizes a separate type of entity called an 
“industrial loan company” (under Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21), which does not qualify for the federal ILC 
exception. Rather, that entity avoids bank status entirely under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B) because it is 
not qualified to accept deposits. For simplicity, the text uses the common term “ILC” to refer to the 
Utah industrial bank. 
 6. Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A, 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1. 
 7. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843 (notice obligations), 1844 (reporting obligations), 1831o (capital 
requirements); 12 CFR Part 325 (prompt corrective action rules). 
 8. For analysis of what the “non-financial” limitation means in this context, see Federal Reserve 
System, Order Determining That Certain Activities Are Complementary to the Financial Activity of 
Underwriting and Selling Health Insurance (Sept. 7, 2007). 
 9. See FDIC Press Release PR73-2006 (July 28, 2006) (announcing a 6-month moratorium on 
ILC applications); FDIC Press Release PR7-2007 (Jan. 31, 2007) (12-month extension of the 
moratorium). 
 10. The assets of ILCs have grown from $4 billion in 1987 to $140 billion as of 2005. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-621, Industrial Loan Corporations: Recent Asset Growth 
and Commercial Interest Highlight Differences in Regulatory Authority (2005). 
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ability to avoid intrusive oversight and supervision would give it an unfair 
competitive advantage. Wal-Mart’s response is that the loophole has been 
around for decades, and that there is no difference between Wal-Mart using 
this loophole and companies like GM, BMW and General Electric that do 
the same.11 Most pointedly, why should Target, a prominent competitor, 
have access to this loophole while Wal-Mart does not?12 Given the large 
share of Target’s corporate profits derived from its ILC and its credit card 
bank,13 Wal-Mart’s question is a fair one.14
This article situates those debates in the context of payments policy. 
Stepping away from banking policy per se, Wal-Mart’s plans should be 
viewed in the historical context of the overlapping shifts in payment 
systems that are happening in this country: from older payment systems 
(cash and checks) that are public, paper-based, and universal, to newer 
systems (predominantly credit and debit cards) that are private, electronic, 
and networked.15 Thus, in 2004, for the first time, the value of retail 
purchases made with credit and debit cards exceeded the value of retail 
purchases made with checks.16
At the turn of this century, a new era of payments is beginning. 
Despite the obvious benefits payment cards have brought to our 
 11. The prominent ILCs of non-financial entities have remarkably different missions. BMW uses 
an ILC to issue a consumer credit card. Target and Volvo use use ILCs to issue payment and credit 
cards for businesses. General Motors uses its industrial bank to provide car financing. GE’s ILC is a 
diversified multinational financing entity. Most interesting of all, Volkswagen’s industrial bank 
specializes in home equity lending. 
 12. Target uses its Utah ILC to issue its business credit card. It also has a CEBA credit card bank 
(under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) for its consumer credit card operations. 
 13. About one quarter of Target’s 2005 earnings ($573 million out of $2.4 billion) came from its 
credit card operations. Target 2005 10K at 24. 
 14. I note for the sake of completeness three similar organizational forms that would not suit Wal-
Mart’s purposes: a nonbank bank, a CEBA credit-card bank, and a Utah industrial loan company under 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21. Wal-Mart cannot form a nonbank bank because the loophole for those 
entities was closed in 1987 – entities holding those banks are exempt from BHC status only if they 
controlled the bank before 1987 and if the entity refrains both from making commercial loans and from 
accepting demand deposits. The Federal Reserve previously had tried to treat the parents of those 
entities as BHCs under Regulation Y, but the Supreme Court overturned the applicable regulation in 
Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). A CEBA credit-card bank 
(authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) might be useful for credit card operations, but would not be 
useful if Wal-Mart wished to engage in other activities such as electronic check processing. Finally the 
Utah industrial loan company under Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21 would solve Wal-Mart’s BHC problem 
(because the entity would not be a bank under the BHCA), but without deposit insurance it could not 
get an account at the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 461(b)(1)(A). A bank without an account at 
the Federal Reserve could not send or receive ACH transactions directly, a significant part of Wal-
Mart’s plan. 
 15. For a detailed discussion of those shifts, see Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth 
and Regulation of Payment Card Markets ch. 1 (2006). 
 16. See Nilson Report Issues 761, 823. 
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economy,17 the maturation and market dominance18 of the private 
networked electronic systems operated by Visa and MasterCard has had 
two adverse effects. First, a diminished incentive to innovate has led to 
stagnation in the development of less expensive payment systems. Second, 
the network effects that pose a barrier to entry have allowed Visa and 
MasterCard to deploy strategies designed to suit the interests of the banks 
that control them, to the detriment of the merchants and cardholders that 
use and accept the cards. The last decade has seen increased recognition by 
merchants of the important link between payment systems and the 
profitability of their operations. Wal-Mart’s application is but one of the 
steps merchants and others are taking to undercut the effective control of 
the payments systems that the large payment card networks have 
established in the last half century. Seen from that perspective, a powerful 
case can be made that granting Wal-Mart’s application would have had a 
salutary effect on a market that has seen too little competition and 
innovation for the last two decades. 
Part 2 begins by discussing the payments markets in which Sam’s 
Bank would have participated and the likely consequence of permitting its 
entry into those markets. Part 3 analyzes the regulatory interests affected by 
the creation of Sam’s Bank. Finally Part 4 discusses broader policy 
concerns that weigh even more directly in favor of facilitating greater entry 
to the payments industries. Finally, Part 5 proposes a new regulatory 
framework for “payment services providers,” designed to facilitate the 
entry of parties like Wal-Mart that would bring new strength to the 
payments industries without engaging in activities that implicate the 
traditional concerns associated with regulation of depository institutions. 
II. WAL-MART AND PAYMENTS POLICY 
The existing debate has not seriously analyzed how Wal-Mart’s stated 
business objectives might affect the policy decision whether to permit Wal-
Mart to go forward. However much Wal-Mart might be able to operate a 
profitable set of retail banks from its immense network of retail locations,19 
 17. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 3 (discussing cost savings from the use of cards 
for payment and lending transactions). 
 18. Although the market in which the literally thousands of potential credit card issuers compete 
against themselves is highly competitive, competition at the network level (with and between Visa and 
MasterCard) is considerably less robust. As discussed below, there are several other electronic 
payments networks, the PIN-based debit networks, the ACH network, and the developing Check 21 
processing networks. In general, however, those networks are competing to draw volume from paper-
based systems rather than competing against the credit card networks. 
 19. The skepticism about Wal-Mart’s proposal comes in part from Wal-Mart’s previous attempts 
to acquire banks and in part from its current forays in to retail banking in places like Mexico and 
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the reason Wal-Mart wanted a bank at this time was to lower the costs it 
incurs in collecting payments from its customers. A bank would have given 
Wal-Mart direct access not only to the systems for processing credit cards 
and debit cards, but also to the increasingly important electronic systems 
for check processing (automated clearinghouse or “ACH” networks). 
Wal-Mart and Cost-Cutting 
Wal-Mart’s desire to cut payment costs should not be surprising. Wal-
Mart is famous for pressing suppliers to lower their costs – steadily, 
substantially, and repeatedly. But the costs of payment services for Wal-
Mart – the costs it pays to process checks and the fees it pays when it 
accepts credit cards or debit cards – have not gone down substantially in 
years. On the contrary, the price of those products – which are at their core 
sophisticated information processing services – has remained stable as the 
costs of information processing have fallen. There was a time when Visa 
and MasterCard were leaders in the deployment of cutting-edge 
information technology,20 but as their dominance in the marketplace has 
grown, the incentives to increase the efficiency of their technology have 
become less pressing. 
To be sure, Wal-Mart has benefited in labor-cost savings and in speed 
of checkout as customers have shifted from slower paper-based checking 
systems to faster card-based payment systems.21 And the rise of electronic 
check conversion lowers Wal-Mart’s payment acceptance costs 
considerably, at least for the check writers that patronize its stores.22 But 
the charges for the increasingly mainstream credit card products offered by 
Visa and MasterCard remain stagnant. Thus, by comparison to the costs of 
the other products their customers might use to make payments, the charges 
Canada. See Steve Goldstein, Wal-Mart Gets Approval to Offer Banking in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
24, 2006; Hollie Shaw & Carrie Tait, Wal-Mart Eyes Banking, National Post, Oct. 31, 2006. It also is 
relevant that Wal-Mart’s present plans would not bind the resulting ILC. Under applicable FDIC 
regulations, Wal-Mart after only a few years would have been able to broaden the scope of its 
operations considerably, though it would have needed the consent of the FDIC for major changes. See 
12 CFR § 333.2. 
 20. See Dee Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age ch. 12 (1999); Dee Hock, One from Many: VISA 
and the Rise of Chaordic Organization ch. 12 (2005). 
 21. See Elizabeth Klee, Paper or Plastic? The Effect of Time on Check and Debit Card Use at 
Grocery Stores (unpublished November 2004 manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687159 (empirical analysis indicating that check 
transactions typically take about 30 seconds longer than payment card transactions). 
 22. Electronic check conversion converts a paper check at the point of sale to an ACH transaction 
cleared through the NACHA network (a POP entry in NACHA’s terminology). Wal-Mart has been 
among the market leaders in retail adoption of that technology. Stuck in a Rut, POP E-Checks Get a 
Boost from Bentonville, Digitaltransactions.net (Sept. 13, 2006). 
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that Wal-Mart pays when it accepts Visa and MasterCard products seem 
increasingly out of line.23
Wal-Mart’s dissatisfaction with the credit card, in particular, is 
exacerbated by competition with discount and dollar stores that often do 
not accept credit cards at all. The costs of credit card acceptance are less 
problematic for high-end retailers, which operate on high margins and 
depend on the discretionary and impulsive spending that credit cards 
facilitate.24 Wal-Mart’s traditional emphasis on low prices,25 by contrast, 
leaves it with low margins against which a fixed payment cost that does not 
decline over time has become increasingly conspicuous. 
Cutting the Costs of Payments 
The tension between the relatively stable costs of credit card 
acceptance and Wal-Mart’s cost-cutting philosophy has long motivated 
Wal-Mart to explore possible responses that would lower its costs. For 
example, Wal-Mart was one of the lead plaintiffs in the successful “honor 
all cards” litigation against Visa and MasterCard and has been a leader in 
facilitating non-card payment systems at its Web site. Thus, properly 
viewed, the application to form Sam’s Bank is the latest in a continuing 
series of payments policy initiatives. To understand this particular 
initiative, it is useful to explore exactly how it would lower payment costs. 
Credit Cards 
The conventional explanation assumes that Wal-Mart would form an 
industrial loan company that would operate as an acquirer much like the 
ILC subsidiary of First Data Corporation (the largest acquirer in the 
country, with more than a 50% share of a market).26 But this would not 
 23. Although it is difficult to generalize because precise figures are proprietary, a merchant like 
Wal-Mart on a $100 transaction probably pays about $1.80 if it accepts a credit card, $1.00 if it accepts 
a Visa or MasterCard debit card, eighty cents if it accepts a check, fifty cents if it accepts a PIN-based 
debit card, and twenty-five cents if it performs an electronic check conversion. Honor-all-cards policies 
have made it difficult for merchants to limit the types of networked payment products that they accept, 
while surcharge restrictions have made it difficult for merchants to affect consumer choice between and 
among networked and universal payments. The result from the merchant’s perspective is that 
consumers driven by advertising and rewards programs choose payment products unaffected by the 
high marginal cost that the merchant pays to accept those products. 
 24. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, chs. 4, 12 (showing that consumers spend more 
when they use payment cards than when they use paper-based payment products). 
 25. See Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism 52-56 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed. 
2006). 
 26. Visa and MasterCard require all entities that participate directly in their networks (either by 
issuing cards or acquiring transactions) to be banks. Because ILCs qualify as banks without subjecting 
their parents to federal BHC regulation, nonbank processing companies like First Data have used ILCs 
to conduct their acquisition businesses. {First Data recently converted its Colorado ILC to a non-
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lower Wal-Mart’s net payment costs in any substantial amount. Let us 
suppose that Wal-Mart is currently paying its acquirer (Chase Paymentech, 
a joint venture including Chase and First Data) about 1.65% in merchant 
fees on its Visa and MasterCard transactions (an excellent rate for a 
merchant that is not a grocery store).27 If we substitute Sam’s Bank as the 
acquirer, Wal-Mart would pay that 1.65% to its subsidiary instead of to 
Chase Paymentech. 
The problem, however, is that Sam’s Bank would have to forward 
something in the range of 1.43% of those funds to Visa and MasterCard 
(the interchange share) and would have to fund its payment processing 
operations out of the remaining 0.22% of revenues. Because the business of 
acquiring credit card transactions is competitive, the spread that acquirers 
retain has been dropping substantially in recent years. As information 
technology advances, it becomes cheaper to process payments, particularly 
for the largest companies (First Data, Bank of America, and Nova). There 
is little reason to think that Sam’s Bank could process its payments at a cost 
that would leave it with any substantial profit – indeed there is good reason 
to think that Sam’s Bank would lose money if it undertook to process 
payments at the same price as Chase Paymentech. Even with Wal-Mart as a 
client, Sam’s Bank would be a much smaller and less experienced acquirer 
than First Data.28
If that were the whole story, then Wal-Mart in fact might lose money 
if it inserted its subsidiary as the acquirer. That possibility suggests that 
Wal-Mart’s plan is more complex. Perhaps, it also includes issuing Visa or 
MasterCard credit cards to its customers, something Wal-Mart cannot do 
industrial trust, to accommodate its pending takeover by KKR. See First Data Gets OK to Convert 
Industrial Bank, DENV. BUS. J., July 19, 2007. Originally, all acquirers were banks, but in recent years, 
the market has become dominated by technology companies that specialize in efficient processing. First 
Data Corporation now processes about half of all general-purpose credit card transactions in the United 
States. See Top U.S. Acquirers, Nilson Report, Issue 854, at 1, 7 (Apr. 2006). Although the market is 
increasingly concentrated, the market for acquisition is competitive, in the sense that a large number of 
acquirers compete for merchants based on the price that they charge. As of 2006, 90 acquirers 
processed more than $1 million transactions per week. 
 27. The lowest credit card interchange rate for a non-supermarket merchant is 1.43% under the 
current rates for either Visa or MasterCard, available at 
http://usa.visa.com/download/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/Interchange_Rate_Sheets
.pdf and at 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/14992_MasterCard_Interchange_Rates_and_Criteria_-
_October_2006.pdf. If Wal-Mart pays 1.65% of the sales price to its acquirer and its acquirer (currently 
Chase Paymentech) pays 1.43% of the sales price to the issuers, the acquirer receives only 0.22% of the 
revenues to fund the costs of processing Wal-Mart’s transactions. 
 28. If anything, the pending acquisition of First Data by KKR suggests the possibility of an inflow 
of capital likely to increase the aggressiveness of First Data’s operations. See Joe Bel Bruno, KKR 
Continues Talks for First Data Loans, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2007 (discussing difficulties KKR faces in 
obtaining financing for its acquisition of First Data). 
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directly unless it owns a bank. Target, of course, has done this with great 
success, with its earnings in recent years from its credit card unit growing 
much more rapidly than earnings from retail sales.29 And this is an option 
on which Wal-Mart would save even if it were not as skillful as Target at 
lending to its customers. The key point would be that Sam’s Bank as issuer 
would receive the interchange revenues, the roughly 1.4% of all sales that 
the acquirer currently forwards through the Visa and MasterCard system. 
Of course, Wal-Mart could try to accomplish the same thing by 
offering its own store-branded card without opening a bank. But it has done 
that already, most recently with a Discover product issued by GE 
Consumer Finance. Historically, however, as Target’s experience shows, it 
is much easier for a retailer to get a card to the “top of the wallet” if it is a 
Visa or MasterCard product than if it is a store-branded card. If Wal-Mart’s 
customers (like Target’s before them) used the store-branded card rarely, 
then that strategy would not lower Wal-Mart’s payment costs substantially. 
Thus, Wal-Mart’s plan likely includes not only acquiring card transactions 
from its stores, but also becoming a Visa or MasterCard issuer. 
Check Conversion 
As the discussion above suggests, Wal-Mart also is interested in the 
costs it incurs when it accepts payments from customers that do not use 
credit cards.30 For example, given the demographics of Wal-Mart’s 
customers, Wal-Mart presumably is one of the largest recipients of checks 
among American merchants, and thus has the greatest incentive to lower 
the costs of check processing.31 If Wal-Mart in its capacity as merchant can 
save money by converting those paper checks to electronic checks at the 
point of sale, it is natural to wonder if Wal-Mart could not save even more 
money by eliminating the middleman and participating directly in the 
processing of check conversion transactions. Those transactions already are 
much cheaper for the retailer than checks or conventional credit and debit 
 29. Target’s credit card earnings grew from $420 million in 2004 (13% of total earnings) to $573 
million in 2005 (23% of total earnings) to $693 million in 2006 (25% of total earnings, while its non-
credit card earnings shrank from $2.758 billion in 2004 to $2.094 billion in 2006. See Target 2005 10K 
at 24; Target 2006 10K. 
 30. Although the share of customers that pay with checks has fallen from 27% to 16% in the last 4 
years alone, Wal-Mart will still receive more than 1 billion checks in 2007. The cost savings to Wal-
Mart of converting those checks to electronic transactions is significant. Wal-Mart Goes Chainwide 
With POP In Bid To Cut Payment Costs, DigitalTransactionNews (Apr. 17, 2007). 
 31. Check use is increasingly concentrated among adult Americans without credit cards. Adult 
Americans without credit cards are for the most part lower in income and wealth than those with credit 
cards, and because Wal-Mart is a dominant retailer for that sector of our society, Wal-Mart presumably 
has a higher share of customers that do not have credit cards than many other retailers. 
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card products. Moreover, continuing developments of technology and 
infrastructure are making the product even better suited for large retailers 
like Wal-Mart with many checkout lanes at a single location.32 Still, they 
have been slow to gain a major place in the consumer payments market. 
Yet Wal-Mart is ideally suited to deploy them, with a large customer base 
unusually likely to contain check writers. Thus, Wal-Mart well might 
believe that it eventually could present and settle those items more cheaply 
than existing financial institutions.33
Debit Cards 
Similar reasoning applies to PIN-based debit card transactions, which 
traditionally have been processed over regional networks like NYCE and 
Pulse, rather than the international networks like Visa and MasterCard. 
Again, because that market has faced less competition than the market for 
acquiring Visa and MasterCard transactions, it is easier to see how Wal-
Mart could profit by cutting out a “middleman” bank from those 
transactions. Wal-Mart has taken indirect steps to cut out that middleman 
by its participation in Debitman (now Tempo).34 But Debitman has been 
slow to penetrate the market.35 As with any new payment system, it is not 
enough that one party (the merchant in this case) prefers the system; there 
has to be some effective motivation to cause the consumer to use the 
system as well. The difficulties Debitman has faced are the most 
conspicuous evidence of the continuing power of the network effects 
associated with the maturation of the Visa and MasterCard systems. In the 
end, it should be no surprise that Wal-Mart’s application emphasizes its 
intention to deploy its own debit cards.36
 32. See Nadia Oehlsen, Check Conversion Moves to the Back Office, Cards & Payments, Dec. 
2006, at 44; Christopher Westfall, The U.S. Payments System: Needing Consolidation, or Fine As Is?, 
Banking Insider, Dec. 22, 2006. 
 33. If Wal-Mart has any interest in that product, it could not form a CEBA credit card bank under 
the 1841(c)(2)(F) exception, because it would go beyond the “credit card operations” to which those 
entities are limited. 
 34. Debitman is a debit card network in which customers obtain cards from retailers rather than 
from their banks. The cards fund purchases through the ACH network, which is much less expensive 
than the conventional debit card processing systems. NACHA presumably cooperates with Debitman 
because the success of Debitman would shift transaction volume to the ACH network from the 
traditional check-processing and PIN-based debit-card networks. A Debitman transaction costs a 
participating retailer about fifteen cents, much less than the fifty cents that is the typical cost of a 
conventional PIN-based debit card transaction. The transaction is even cheaper if the customer uses a 
Debitman card issued by the retailer, because the retailer receives a rebate of about half of the fifteen-
cent fee. See www.tempopay.com; Debitman Rebuilds and Targets Card Association, Cards Int’l, Issue 
372, at 1 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter Debitman Rebuilds]. 
 35. See Debitman Rebuilds, supra note 34. 
 36. See Application, supra note 1, at 1. 
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Internet Payments 
Wal-Mart’s concerns have particular significance on the Internet, 
where Visa and MasterCard traditionally have held an even more dominant 
position than at retail. Credit cards dominated Internet retail when that 
market first arose in the late 1990’s largely because traditional competitors 
(checks and cash) were wholly impractical for remote electronic 
purchases.37 But the failure of Visa and MasterCard to give adequate 
attention to problems of fraud and data security has given merchants a 
powerful incentive to search for new payment alternatives. And in the 
Internet environment, where all interactions are electronic, products like 
Bill Me Later and Google Checkout (both discussed in more detail below) 
have spread much more rapidly than products like Debitman have spread in 
the conventional retail environment. 
Wal-Mart.com is a major force in Internet retail, with more than a 
billion dollars in annual sales, one of the very largest operations outside the 
office supply and electronics sectors.38 As discussed above, Wal-Mart 
already has been a leader in supporting the use of electronic check 
conversion at the retail counter. If Wal-Mart had a bank (and thus had 
direct access to the networks over which those payments are processed), 
there is every reason to think that it could accelerate the design and 
deployment of non-card payment products on the Internet, breaking down 
the dominant market power that Visa and MasterCard have in that sector. 
III. BANK REGULATION 
Although the preceding discussion suggests that consumers might 
benefit if Wal-Mart had a bank, it provides no justification for exempting 
Wal-Mart and its bank from appropriate banking regulations. On that point, 
the United States has abandoned since the Great Depression the notion that 
the market can be trusted to monitor the safety and soundness of banks.39 
The problem is not simply that banks are large enterprises with substantial 
assets. American car manufacturers, airlines, and steel companies all at one 
time were large enterprises with assets far exceeding those of most banks.40 
Yet those entities were never subject to the kind of pervasive ongoing 
 37. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 260-70 (3rd ed. 
2005). 
 38. Internet Retailer, Top 500 Guide (2006). 
 39. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Banking Law and Regulation 80-92 (3rd ed. 2001). 
 40. That is particularly true in the United States, where populist concerns have kept most banks 
relatively small. See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American 
Corporate Finance (1994). 
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bureaucratic supervision to which banks and their owners are regularly 
subjected (and from which Wal-Mart is now and would continue to be 
exempt). Some in recent years have argued that banks should be treated 
like other large companies – with considerably less supervision and 
regulation.41 But the idea that banks need no constraints will get little 
policy traction as long as the crises of the 1980’s can be recalled. In this 
context, two particular concerns are important: the separation of commerce 
and banking, and the systemic harms from bank failure. Neither concern 
would apply to an ILC limited to the provision of payment services. 
Separating Commerce from Banking 
Among other things, the systemic bank failures during the Depression 
produced an abiding sense that banks should be separate from large 
commercial enterprises.42 The importance of this concern in modern 
banking regulation is difficult to gauge. For one thing, it is not clear that 
this concern has ever been entirely sincere. It always has had the effect of 
insulating financial institutions from competition by potentially more 
nimble non-financial firms. And given the relatively small size of 
American banks, it often (as in the case of Wal-Mart) excludes owners of 
undoubted liquidity and soundness.43 It also is relevant that most of our 
important trading partners (Japan and Germany being the most conspicuous 
examples) have robust banking systems without any such separation.44 The 
weakening of legal constraints on non-financial companies that came with 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley surely reflects growing skepticism about the 
importance of this problem.45 Yet, federal law still imposes considerable 
restraints on financial holding companies, restraints that Wal-Mart wishes 
to avoid. 
Whatever their general weight, concerns about the confluence of 
commerce and banking are ill-placed here. The principal argument against 
confluence points to the likely concentration of financial assets and the 
 41. Peter Wallison, Why Do We Regulate Banks, Financial Services Outlook (AEI Online Aug. 1, 
2005). 
 42. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 22-24. The concern is not nearly as strong in Canada, 
where a system of larger banks survived the Depression unscathed. See Duncan McDowall, Quick to 
the Frontier: Canada’s Royal Bank (1993). 
 43. See Lawrence J. White, Should Wal-Mart, Real Estate Brokers, and Banks Be in Bed 
Together? A Principles-Based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 
NYU Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 07-23. 
 44. For a detailed discussion, see Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the 
United States: An Examination of Principal Issues 24-33 (OCC Working Paper 99-1). 
 45. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 464-67. 
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corresponding potential for inequity in the lending markets.46 The idea is 
that the commerce/banking conglomerate will have an advantage over the 
purely commercial enterprise because it will provide financing to its related 
commercial enterprises that will not be available to unrelated third-party 
competitors. As the Senate Banking Committee said in a report on the 
subject: “The separation of banking from commerce helps ensure that 
banks allocate credit impartially, and without conflicts of interest. The 
nonbank bank loophole * * * raises the risk that banks’ credit decisions will 
be based not on economic merit but on the business strategies of their 
corporate parents.”47 More generally, the distinction between commerce 
and banking increasingly seems incoherent as applied to payments 
providers, which increasingly are IT firms. The increasing importance of IT 
as the core competency of these firms raises the natural question why First 
Data should be treated differently from Microsoft or Google, or even from 
Wal-Mart. 
In sum, that rationale offers little reason to oppose Sam’s Bank, at 
least in the form in which it was proposed, because Sam’s Bank would not 
have been a commercial lender. Rather, it would have been a payments 
processor. A payments processing enterprise need not involve the 
aggregation of assets and lending power that poses a risk to the efficient 
allocation of investment capital. 
Systemic Effects of Bank Failure 
The most obvious justification for the distinction between banks and 
other large enterprises is that the failure of a bank that accepts deposits is 
more likely to have a cascading effect than the failure of any other 
corporate enterprise, even a large one. When a large corporate enterprise 
fails, the resulting financial distress is borne primarily (though not entirely) 
by that institution’s shareholders and its contract partners (creditors, 
suppliers, employees, and the like). In the case of a depository institution, 
however, there is a greater risk that the failure of the institution will have 
ripple effects extending throughout the economy to the creditors of 
creditors. This is particularly true when the bank that fails holds large 
deposits from other banks. So, regulators traditionally have regarded large 
banks as “too big to fail,” because of the likelihood that their failure would 
 46. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 460-63. 
 47. See S. Rep. No. 100-19, at 8-10 (1987). 
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bring down other banks, causing distress to the depositors of those banks 
and more broadly through the economy.48
More recently, as the sophistication with which examiners study bank 
operations has increased, regulators have given growing attention to the 
likelihood that a bank’s financial arrangements are so intertwined with 
those of other entities as to create a substantial risk of this kind of 
cascading failure. Thus, we can see now, even relatively small institutions 
could create serious problems if they are involved in activities that affect 
other banks. In this literature, the risks rest not only on the size of deposits, 
but also on large-scale payments processing.49
At first glance, the focus of Sam’s Bank seems to play directly into 
this justification.50 But that view fails to account for the nature of the 
payments that Sam’s Bank would handle and how those differ from the 
large-dollar wholesale payments that create systemic payment risks. In 
general, serious risks from payments processing are associated with the 
“real-time gross value” settlement systems that are customary for wholesale 
payment operations – in which each entity gives and receives full credit for 
a transfer at the moment that it is made.51 In the United States, for example, 
the Fedwire system transfers about $1.5 trillion each day, and provides 
real-time value at the moment a transfer is made for each of those 
payments. In that type of system, the possibility that a bank might be 
unable to settle its position at the end of a business day raises a risk for 
each institution to which the failed bank sent payments during the course of 
the day. In the Fedwire system, the Federal Reserve banks mitigate that risk 
by guaranteeing Fedwire payments through the course of each day.52
The payment operations of Sam’s Bank would present less risk. For 
one thing, the individual daily obligations would be much smaller. The 
Fedwire system commonly permits major banks to make payments during 
the course of a single day that substantially exceed the capital of the 
 48. Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts (2004). 
 49. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio & Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels 
Govern (2006). 
 50. Thus, a bipartisan group of congressmen, in a Mar. 10, 2006 letter to the FDIC, assert that 
given the retailer’s “massive scope and international dealings,” its entry into the banking industry would 
carry too many risks. For example, “a financial crisis within the company could damage the bank and 
severely disrupt the flow of payments throughout the financial system.” Letter from Stephanie Tubbs 
Jones et al. to Martin Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC (dated Mar. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/walmart/comment_letters_5/tubbs-jones.pdf. 
 51. It was the exposure of wire-transfer participants at the time of the 1974 failure of Germany’s 
Herstatt bank that first made the systemic payments risk a common topic of policy concern. See Mann, 
Payment Systems, supra note 37, at 239-40; see also Proposed Directive on Payment Services in the 
Internal Market, (COM(2005)603), at 6 [hereinafter Payment Services Directive]. 
 52. See Mann, Payment Systems, supra note 37, at 211-15. 
A REQUIEM FOR SAM'S BANK 2/26/2008  11:58:17 AM 
114 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 74:800 
 
institution. The sums at stake in the consumer realm are not nearly so large. 
Even for the largest participants in the credit card system, the daily sums 
are much smaller than the institution’s capital base. JPMorgan Chase 
cardholders, for example, spend about $1 billion per day, but the 
institution’s net worth is in the range of $20 trillion.53 JPMorgan’s 
solvency is unlikely to be substantially affected by daily fluctuations in the 
inflow and outflow of payments that typically amount to a tiny fraction of a 
percent of its market capitalization. 
Moreover, the settlement systems for the small consumer payments 
are designed to avoid the liquidity risks associated with wholesale funds 
transfers. For example, payments made through the Visa and MasterCard 
system are made through multilateral netting at the end of each day. Visa 
and MasterCard use Fedwire to apply a single daily credit (or debit) to the 
Federal Reserve account of each of their members that reflects the net 
inflow or outflow of that member’s daily cards transactions. Similarly, the 
electronic check payments that Sam’s Bank might clear through its Web 
site would be processed in batches through the ACH network on a daily 
basis, with net settlements that pose little if any systemic risk.54
If it seems technical to suggest that the details of the process of 
settling payments can have such an important effect on the systemic risk 
those payments raise, consider the following hypothetical. On a given day, 
Bank of America acquires $100 million of credit card transactions on cards 
issued half each by CitiBank and Chase, Citibank acquires $80 million of 
transactions on cards issued half each by Bank of America and Chase, and 
Chase acquires $60 million of transactions on cards issued half each by 
Bank of America and CitiBank. In a gross settlement system, each of those 
banks would pay to the others the entire sums that they owed. Bank of 
America would send out $70 million ($40 to Citi and $30 to Chase). Citi 
would send out $80 million ($50 to BoA and $30 to Chase). And Chase 
would send out $90 million ($50 to BoA and $40 to Citi). In a system of 
multilateral netting, the payments are much smaller. Bank of America 
receives $30 million, Citi would make no payment at all, and Chase would 
send out $30 million. 
Because the total payments are so much larger in a gross system ($240 
million as opposed to $30 in multilateral netting), it is crucial that 
consumer payments processing involves multilateral netting rather than 
 53. See Card Volume at Merchants, Nilson Report, Issue 859, at 1, 9 (June 2006); JPMorgan 
Chase 2005 10K. 
 54. See Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfers § 5.01 (discussing ACH 
settlement process). 
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gross settlements. Thus, even if an entity like Sam’s Bank were to fail, it is 
unlikely that the amounts that it would owe to any particular institution 
would undermine the solvency of that institution. Looking back to the 
regulatory justifications discussed above, this suggests a relatively limited 
systemic need for supervision of the operations of Sam’s Bank. 
IV. THOUGHTS ON A BETTER WAY 
As discussed above, the primary consideration should be the 
possibility that Wal-Mart’s entry to the payments markets would drive 
product innovation and cost-cutting that would benefit consumers either 
directly or through diminution of the dominant market positions that Visa 
and MasterCard currently hold. We seem to stand at a decisive point in the 
history of the payments industry. Long dominated by cash and checks, 
payment systems that were directly or indirectly supervised by the 
government, the last thirty years have brought increasing dominance to the 
private and largely unregulated payments networks built by Visa and 
MasterCard. Those networks have contributed great value to the economy 
by driving down the costs of payments and lending,55 but the fact remains 
that they are operated for the private benefit of the banks that own them. At 
the same time, Visa and MasterCard have retained for decades a dominant 
market position, repelling repeated challenges from entities like American 
Express, Discover, JCB, Diner’s Club, and Carte Blanche. It is easy to 
understand the reasons for that dominance: network effects make it 
extremely difficult for new entrants to gain a foothold in the provision of 
payment systems.56 Because those effects underscore the strength of the 
networks’ market dominance, the shift from public systems to a pair of 
persistently dominant private systems is at least potentially troubling.57
Of course, one possibility is that the antitrust system will break down 
the dominant positions of Visa and MasterCard – either through private 
litigation or through actions brought by federal regulators. But given the 
difficulties and complexities of an antitrust response, surely it is worth 
considering a more market-oriented approach: fostering entry by 
competitors. Entry by Wal-Mart well might present the incumbents with a 
more serious challenge than they have faced in decades. Wal-Mart has a 
network of almost 4000 locations in the United States, with tens of millions 
 55. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 3. 
 56. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, chs. 6-8 (attributing the unique dominance of 
credit cards in United States markets to their earlier deployment here). 
 57. For discussion of the effects of the competitive power of the major networks, see Mann, 
Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 11. 
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of devoted customers. If Wal-Mart is as capable here as it has been in other 
aspects of its business, pressure from Wal-Mart could drive considerable 
improvement – some combination of new products or better prices. 
The entry of Wal-Mart would be salutary not solely because of the 
possibility that competitive pressure will reduce costs and drive innovation 
in product design. By broadening the groups involved in the design and 
deployment of products, it would broaden the range of pricing strategies. 
To explain, the existing networks of Visa and MasterCard increasingly 
depend on a strategy under which merchants will pay an interchange fee 
that provides sufficient revenue to issuers to fund programs that foster 
higher spending and borrowing by cardholders.58 That strategy has been 
effective because network effects pose a barrier to new entrants that might 
use different strategies and because even with a high interchange fee the 
payment card system is in many contexts more attractive to merchants than 
the paper-based systems it is replacing. 
But systems designed by merchants or other industry players would 
doubtless use a fundamentally different pricing strategy. The most obvious 
approach is a system like Debitman, which can provide payment services 
more cheaply because it avoids the costs of subsidizing the business-
development programs issuers fund with interchange revenues. Similarly, 
Bill Me Later is rapidly gaining attention, especially among airlines, but 
also at mainstream sites like Walmart.com. Bill Me Later undercuts 
standard credit-card interchange rates by avoiding the speedy approval and 
settlement process of the credit-card networks.59 The neutral pricing 
strategy of products like Debitman and Bill Me Later makes sense for 
merchants that do not depend on the discretionary spending that the 
aggressive rewards and teaser-rate strategies of Visa and MasterCard 
motivate. 
More intriguing are the recent developments that presage a world of 
below-marginal-cost pricing of payments services, as payments themselves 
are used to subsidize other business activities. The leader here is Google 
Checkout, which can undercut standard credit-card interchange fees 
because it uses the payments business as a way to attract advertisers.60
 58. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 13; Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and 
the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 Ill. L. Rev. 375. 
 59. See Peter Burrows, Big Plastic’s Online Challenger, Business Week, Dec. 30, 2005; Jennifer 
LeClaire, Online Merchants Choosing Alternative Payment Options, E-Commerce Times, Dec. 21, 
2005. 
 60. See Miguel Helft, Google Steps More Boldly into PayPal’s Territory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 
2006, at C1. PayPal pioneered a simpler strategy. It offers payment services to merchants at a blended 
price that undercuts the credit card networks because some PayPal purchasers fund their purchases 
through cheaper ACH transactions. Visa and MasterCard initially contested PayPal’s right to process 
A REQUIEM FOR SAM'S BANK 2/26/2008  11:58:17 AM 
1999] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 117 
 
The pricing strategies that Wal-Mart has used for its other financial 
products strongly suggest that Sam’s Bank could subsidize payments costs 
in a similar way. The financial services that Wal-Mart already offers are 
priced very competitively. For example, in the 45 states in which it cashes 
checks, Wal-Mart charges a flat $3 fee, compared to charges from $6 to 
$15 for other check cashers. Apparently Wal-Mart’s prices for money 
orders and wire transfers are very low as well.61 As discussed above, 
owning a bank would allow Wal-Mart to broaden its product lines, bringing 
lower prices to more niches of the consumer financial services market. In 
an era when we are concerned about the ability of traditional financial 
institutions to design products that can be priced attractively for lower-
income individuals, the entry of Wal-Mart bodes well. 
This is not to say that there are no concerns about what Wal-Mart 
might do with its bank. Let us suppose (as seems likely) that Wal-Mart 
prices check cashing so low because the people for whom it cashes checks 
will spend their money in Wal-Mart’s adjacent stores, and that it will use 
the same strategy with new products and services it can deploy through 
Sam’s Bank. Should that cross-subsidization of consumptive activity 
trouble us? My inclination is to view that problem as minor. It may be that 
Wal-Mart can use this tactic to boost sales in its stores, and it may be that 
these kinds of bundling techniques can be used to entice consumers into 
dubious consumption decisions. But given the product lines and brands 
available at Wal-Mart’s typical stores – not exactly focused on indulgence 
and luxury – this problem does not seem serious. 
Another area of concern relates to the credit card product in particular. 
If Wal-Mart plans to issue a general-purpose credit card, should we be 
concerned because of the historical example of Target, where the profits 
from the credit card soon may dwarf the profits that flow directly from 
retail operations?62 As I demonstrate elsewhere, there are significant 
relations between credit card spending, overall debt and bankruptcy, so a 
strategy designed to increase the effectiveness of card marketing to Wal-
Mart customers would raise a serious concern.63 Again, the countervailing 
factor is the likelihood that Wal-Mart would not focus on the profitability 
transactions for third-party sellers, but ultimately backed off because PayPal’s use of the card networks 
increased overall transaction volumes. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment 
Intermediaries, 82 Texas L. Rev. 681 (2004). Even now, it is not clear that PayPal ever will be a threat 
to Visa and MasterCard’s market position on the Internet. 
 61. Supercentre Banking: Wal-Mart and Financial Services, The Economist, Sept. 3, 2005 
(discussing Wal-Mart’s competitive prices for money orders, wire transfers, check cashing services, and 
express bill payments). 
 62. See supra note 29. 
 63. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 5. 
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of credit card issuance per se, but instead on lowering the costs of retail 
payments as a way to foster profits from retail sales. Indeed, the 
longstanding hostility of Wal-Mart to Visa and MasterCard suggests that it 
is much more likely that Wal-Mart will focus on making payment products 
cheaper (something at which it excels) and much less likely that it will 
focus on maximizing interest and fee-based revenue streams (something 
repugnant to its competitive culture, at which it has little or no experience). 
V. A NEW APPROACH 
The preceding discussion underscores both a mismatch between the 
existing regulatory framework and the risks that Sam’s Bank actually 
would pose and an increasingly arbitrary distinction between financial and 
non-financial owners of payment service providers. This suggests value in 
a new approach that would address payment processing risk in a uniform 
and coherent way. The EU’s proposed Payment Services Directive 
provides a useful model. Indeed, because the market position of the credit 
card networks is much stronger here than it is in the EU, there is an even 
greater reason to design a regulatory framework that would encourage 
competition.64
The first step is to identify the best regulator and the appropriate 
population of regulated entities. Because the concern is the risk of payment 
processing, all entities that have access to the clearing and settlement 
systems should be included, and the status of their owners as financial 
entities should be irrelevant. The Federal Reserve Board’s position at the 
center of the major clearing and settlement systems makes it the obvious 
choice as regulator. 
The second step is to decide what type of monitoring and supervision 
is required. Because these institutions would neither take deposits nor 
engage in commercial or consumer lending,65 the level of supervision 
should be considerably less than for traditional depository institutions. The 
principal regulatory activity should be to ensure the maintenance of a level 
of liquidity commensurate with the types of payment operations in which 
the entities engage. The emphasis should be on liquidity rather than capital, 
 64. The sanguine competitive position in the EU might change if the implementation of SEPA (the 
Single Euro Payments Area) leads to continent-wide dominance for Visa and MasterCard. See, e.g., EU 
Warns Cards Market over SEPA, Cards Int’l, Issue 371, at 1 (22 Nov. 2006); ECB Concerned About 
SEPA Duopoly, Cards Int’l, Issue 372, at 17 (6 Dec. 2006). 
 65. The purpose of this framework is to permit access to payment systems for entities that have no 
need to engage in banking. To the extent the owners of these entities are involved in other finance-
related businesses like credit-card lending or other types of consumer finance, those activities would 
remain subject to appropriate scrutiny under other frameworks. 
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because the concern is whether the entity will be able to settle its 
transactions on a daily basis, not whether it has the long-term financial 
strength measured by capital accounts. 
Entities, like Sam’s Bank, that limit themselves to net-settlement 
consumer systems would require relatively low levels of liquidity. Entities 
that seek access to riskier real-time gross settlement systems would be held 
to higher levels. As compared to current regulatory frameworks, this has 
the advantage that the Federal Reserve would be charged with directly 
monitoring and assessing the appropriate levels of liquidity for those 
entities most likely to disrupt the steady flow of payments on which our 
economy increasingly depends. Indeed, given the importance of this 
activity it is startling that the Federal Reserve’s current mandate on these 
questions is so indirect. 
My proposal does not directly address the propriety of retaining the 
rules that exempt ILCs from the supervision required of other entities that 
control financial institutions. Level-playing-field concerns, however, do 
suggest that the other entities that currently use the ILC framework for 
payments operations should be forced into the payment service provider 
category. The existing regulatory framework involves a serious mismatch 
between the activities of those entities – pervasive involvement in 
payments – and the regulatory purposes—attending to deposit protection 
for entities that receive few deposits. Resolution of that mismatch is at the 
heart of my proposal, even without expressing any opinion on the care with 
which the FDIC currently supervises those entities. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this symposium is on the proper level of uniformity in 
the legal rules that govern payment systems. My submission identifies a 
threshold problem, the lack of competition and barriers to entry in the 
markets for payment services providers. My thesis is that a revision of the 
regulatory framework designed to foster competition and lower barriers to 
entry is a valuable part of an effort to design coherent rules. Greater 
competition should foster innovation in payment systems development, 
with more rapid convergence on the systems that respond most effectively 
to the needs of commerce. At the same time, we might have more 
confidence that rules developed in competitive markets provide satisfactory 
answers to problems with unauthorized transactions, error, and the like. 
 
